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Amid the enumerated powers delegated to Congress in the
Constitution is the power to "regulate commerce ...among the several
states."' For over fifty years after President Franklin Roosevelt embarked
on his New Deal with America, the Commerce Clause was interpreted by
the Supreme Court to practically grant plenary power to Congress to pass
regulation.2  During that time, the Court found no federal regulation
unconstitutional on grounds that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause
authority.3 This helps explain the shockwave that swept through both the
legal profession and academy when in 1995, the Supreme Court in United
. J.D. Candidate 2005, Northwestern University School of Law. I would like to thank
Professors John McGinnis, Andy Koppelman, and Cliff Zimmerman, along with Elisa
Hughes and Julie Hendrix, for their helpful advice, comments, and criticisms throughout this
project. I would also like to thank the staff of the Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology
for their continued support.
I U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941)(plenary power).
3 See Grant S. Nelson & Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Rethinking the Commerce Clause:
Applying First Principles to Uphold Federal Commercial Regulations but Preserve State
Control Over Social Issues, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1, 83-84 (1999) ("In the half-century following
Wickard, every one of the vast number of statutes enacted under the Commerce Clause
survived judicial review."); John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America: The




States v. Lopez found the Gun Free School Zone Act (GFSZA) of 1990,
which criminalized possession of guns within 1000 feet of a school zone, to
be an unconstitutional exercise of that authority.4 Chief Justice Rehnquist,
writing for the Court's majority, outlined three categories of regulation to
operate as a limiting principle on the scope of Commerce Clause authority:
the law must regulate a channel of interstate commerce, the law must
regulate an instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the regulated purely
intrastate activity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
5
Being neither a channel of interstate commerce, such as a road or a river,
nor an instrumentality of interstate commerce, such as a truck or a boat, the
GFSZA had to substantially affect interstate commerce to be constitutional.
6
The Court summarily stated that the Act "ha[d] nothing to do with
'commerce,"' thereby placing a limit on Congress in making law under the
Commerce Clause.7
Questions arose as to whether the Court had imposed new, permanent
limitations on Congressional power or whether Lopez was a mere
aberration, nothing more than a flexing of Supreme Court muscle to strike
down a law with no connection to commercial activity whatsoever.' Those
questions were answered in 2000 when the Court again found a law
unconstitutional on the same grounds. 9 In United States v. Morrison, the
Court reviewed whether the private right of action for victims of violent
crimes, created within the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA),
4 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995); cf Charles Fried, Revolutions?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 15 (1995) (stating that the Court's Lopez decision was "startling");
Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 3, at 93 (noting the "avalanche of litigation in the lower
federal courts" triggered by Lopez).
5 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59. The third category will be referred to as the "Substantial
Effects Category" throughout this paper.
6 Id. at 559. See generally James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality: How the
New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 91, 151-53 (2000) (stating examples of the various types of
laws within each category).
7 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
8 See Craig M. Bradley, Federalism and the Federal Criminal Law, 55 HASTINGS L.J.
573, 575 (2004) ("Very few cases have been reversed based on Lopez or Morrison .... ");
Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause: What Does the
Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 732 (2003) ("Indeed, a number of legal scholars
questioned whether Lopez was merely an aberration rather than an indication of a major shift
in doctrine."); Richard W. Garnett, The New Federalism, The Spending Power, and Federal
Criminal Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 5 (arguing that the Rehnquist Court's Federalism
revival may ultimately be "much ado about nothing"); Deborah Jones Merritt, The Fuzzy
Logic of Federalism, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 685, 693 (1996) ("Lopez has deprived
Congress of very little power.").
9 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
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overstepped Commerce Clause boundaries.' ° Aside from solidifying the
limitations imposed by Lopez, Morrison further defines what is required of
a regulation to satisfy the Substantial Effects Category of Lopez.
Specifically, the majority opinion stated four factors to aid in the analysis:
whether the regulation involves "economic activity,"" whether Congress
included a jurisdictional element to limit scope,' 2 whether the stated
legislative intent is rational, 3 and the degree to which the regulation has
more than an attenuated effect on interstate commerce.14 In similar fashion
to Lopez, the Court declared the VAWA unconstitutional as not involving
an economic activity, and hence, not satisfying the Lopez Substantial
Effects Category.1
Justice Thomas concurred in Lopez, sparking a dialogue among
scholars about the original meaning of the word "commerce" at the time of
Constitutional ratification. 6 He reminded the Court of the deviations in the
meaning of commerce caused by the New Deal.' 7  In a future case, he
opined, the Court should "reconsider [the] 'substantial effects' test with an
eye toward constructing a standard that reflects the text and history of the
Commerce Clause without totally rejecting our more recent Commerce
Clause jurisprudence."' 8  This statement was a call to arms to all
10 Violence Against Women Act of 1994 § 40302, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2003) ("All
persons within the United States shall have the right to be free from crimes of violence
motivated by gender."), quoted in Morrison, 529 U.S. at 605.
11 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610. This factor will be referred to as the "Economic Activity
Test" throughout this paper.
12 Id. at 611-12.
'3 Id. at 612.
14 Id. This factor will be referred to as the "Attenuation Factor" throughout this paper.
"5 Id. at 617.
16 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 584 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). See
generally Randy E. Barnett, New Evidence of the Original Meaning of the Commerce
Clause, 55 ARK. L. REV. 847 (2003) [hereinafter Barnett, New Evidence] (furthering the
ongoing debate on the meaning of commerce at the time of ratification); Randy E. Barnett,
The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101 (2001) [hereinafter
Barnett, Original Meaning]; Peter A. Lauricella, The Real "Contract with America ": The
Original Intent of the Tenth Amendment and the Commerce Clause, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1377
(1997) (supporting Justice Thomas's argument for a return to pre-New Deal Commerce
Clause jurisprudence).
17 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Is Id. at 585 (Thomas, J., concurring); see Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627 (Thomas, J.,
concurring) ("By continuing to apply this rootless and malleable standard, however
circumscribed, the Court has encouraged the Federal Government to persist in its view that
the Commerce Clause has virtually no limits.") (emphasis added); see also Sabri v. United
States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1949 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring) ("I continue to doubt that we
have correctly interpreted the Commerce Clause."). In contrast, according to the majority
opinion, the three-category test of the Lopez majority tracked the historical progression of
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Originalists to precisely determine the original meaning of "commerce.' ' 9
Although this body of work has been painstaking, the academics involved
in this debate consciously rejected the majority's Lopez and Morrison tests,
instead focusing on a return to an original meaning of the Commerce
Clause.20
Meanwhile, the lower courts confronted with Commerce Clause
questions began interpreting the majority's tests. Since Morrison was
decided, the new Commerce Clause analysis has been haphazardly applied
by the lower courts, and the culprits for this inconsistency have been the
Economic Activity Test, conjoined with the Attenuation Factor.21
Furthermore, the Court created these new Commerce Clause tests while
reviewing criminal regulation.22 The message sent to Congress was that
although outer limits had always existed on Commerce Clause authority,23
those limits are broad and stretch into a realm rarely associated with
commercial or economic activity-criminal law. 24  The majority's tests
Commerce Clause power. These seemingly new restrictions had both always existed and did
not reject any past precedent. The GFZSA merely was the first instance in which the Court
had the opportunity to review a law crossing the proverbial line. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-
60.
19 See sources cited supra note 16.
20 But see Allan Ides, Economic Activity as a Proxy for Federalism: Intuition and Reason
in United States v. Morrison, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 563 (2001) (arguing that economic
activity is no standard at all because of the immenseness of the concept of "economic");
Diane McGimsey, The Commerce Clause and Federalism after Lopez and Morrison: The
Case for Closing the Jurisdictional-Element Loophole, 90 CALIF. L. REv. 1675 (2002)(advocating supplanting the Lopez and Morrison tests with a jurisdictional test incorporating
a "purpose nexus" requirement); Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal
Commerce Power and Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REv. 554,
556 (1995) (advocating reading Art. 1, § 8 enumerated powers as a general framework for
Federalism rather than as independent, limited realms of Congressional lawmaking
authority).
21 See United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v. Holston,
343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114 (9th Cir. 2003); United
States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bird (Bird I1), 279 F.
Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Tex. 2003); see also United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999)
(pre-Morrison, but employs the Morrison structure).
22 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601 (2000) (VAWA); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (GFSZA).
23 See supra text accompanying note 18. But cf McGinnis, supra note 3, at 518-19
(arguing that the Court imposed new Commerce Clause limitations through criminal law
because "there is simply too much obstructing precedent" to return to a pre-New Deal
interpretation of the Clause and because "ousting the federal government from jurisdiction
over noneconomic matters is less controversial").
24 See Garnett, supra note 8, at 4 (noting that even after Morrison, both the federalization
of crime has continued and the lower courts have not aggressively curbed the trend). See
generally Glenn H. Reynolds & Brannon P. Denning, Lower Court Readings of Lopez, or
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provided little guidance to the lower courts for finding the boundary
between economic criminal conduct and noneconomic criminal conduct.
As such, circuit splits have arisen in a menagerie of criminal law suits
addressing constitutionality under the Commerce Clause. For instance, the
Fifth Circuit held that a law criminalizing possession of child pornography
made with material traveling through interstate commerce is
constitutional.25  In contrast, the Ninth Circuit found the same law
unconstitutional when applied to the owner of a photograph in which both
herself and her ten-year-old daughter were depicted exposing themselves
explicitly. 6
This paper's purpose is to impersonate a Machiavellian scribe,
whispering in the collective ear of the circuit court judges confronting
Commerce Clause challenges. The debate over the original intent of
"commerce" is set aside, with focus being diverted to the operation of the
Economic Activity Test, coupled with the Attenuation Factor. 7 In the
interests of uniformity among the lower courts, consistency with Lopez and
Morrison, and a structured and principled rule of law, this paper proposes
the following limiting interpretation of the two Morrison factors. First, a
law that directly affects some exchange, transaction, or contract of value to
all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. 28 Second, a law
that has the purpose of regulating some exchange, transaction, or contract
of value to all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. 29 In
determining whether a law has the purpose of regulating valuable
transactions, courts should review whether a jurisdictional element is
What if the Supreme Court Held a Constitutional Revolution and Nobody Came?, 2000 Wis.
L. REV. 369, 369-70 (noting some commentators have called Lopez nothing more than
"symbolic").
25 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2003); Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 226 (addressing whether an
owner of photographs and films made for personal use depicting teenage girls engaging in
sexually explicit activity was criminally liable).
26 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1115.
27 See id. at 1119 (beginning with a review of "whether simple intrastate possession of
child pornography, without more, is a commercial or economic activity," and with a review
of "whether the connection between such possession and interstate commerce is attenuated"
both because "they are related and require a similar analytic approach, [and] because they
are the most important ones") (emphasis added); see, e.g., sources cited supra note 16.
28 This category is derived from Morrison's Economic Activity Test.
29 This category is derived from Morrison's Attenuation Factor, which imposes a limit
on the Economic Activity Test. This paper interprets the Attenuation Factor to mean that a
law with only indirect effects on valuable transactions must have the purpose of directly
affecting valuable transactions. All laws that merely indirectly affect valuable transactions
and are shown not to have the purpose of regulating valuable transactions are
unconstitutional. See infra Section IlI.A.
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employed as well as the intent of the legislature in passing the law.30 A law
that satisfies either the direct effect or the purpose category substantially
effects interstate commerce, satisfies Lopez and Morrison, and is resultantly
constitutional.
Section II of this paper briefly surveys the history of the definition of
commerce and shows how its ever-changing definition has been central to
the variation in breadth of the enumerated power. Additionally, the
inconsistencies among the circuit courts in application of Morrison's
Economic Activity Test are explained in this section. In Section III, the
limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed by this paper is itself
tested. First, the structure of the analysis is explained, and justifications for
a limited interpretation of Lopez and Morrison are presented. This paper's
test is also applied to past Supreme Court precedent as a means of
validation in this Section. Although much of the Lopez and Morrison
Commerce Clause analysis is flexible and interpretable, the Supreme Court
was adamant that neither case overturned past Commerce Clause precedent.
Per this stance, any Commerce Clause interpretation that produces results in
conflict with past precedent does not comport with either Lopez or
Morrison. Whether these two cases were correctly decided or not, the
overarching goal of the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed
here is to conform the lower courts to Morrison, not to conform Morrison
to an Originalist's, Textualist's, or Pragmatist's interpretation of the
Commerce Clause. This interpretation is no more relevant than a
Commerce Clause cocktail party anecdote if unable to derive the results
previously reached by the Court. Finally, Section IV is devoted to applying
this newly minted limited Economic Activity interpretation to the quagmire
of lower court criminal law decisions that motivated this paper. This
section explains how adoption of the proposed interpretation creates a
uniform standard and alleviates the current inconsistencies among the lower
courts. The battleground for the New Federalism has formed in the realm
of criminal law, which typically has little to do with economic activity. 3 A
clear approach to adjudicating Commerce Clause attacks is needed if the
Court's New Federalism is to survive in the lower courts.
30 The existence of a jurisdictional element, such as the phrase "traveled through
interstate commerce," is the second factor employed in Morrison. A review of the
legislative intent for passing the law is the third Morrison factor.
31 See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution's Forgotten Cover Letter: An Essay on
the New Federalism and the Original Understanding, 94 MICH. L. REv. 615, 618, 622 ("In
1995, the New Federalism broke out of the limited area of state immunity.").
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II. A SURVEY OF THE INCONSISTENT MEANING OF COMMERCE AND SOME
RECENT EFFECTS OF THAT INCONSISTENCY
The breadth of the power to regulate commerce among the several
states has wildly fluctuated throughout the nation's history. Until the late
nineteenth century, however, the Court barely addressed the scope of the
power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause. The general law
was that regulation of commerce included the regulation of people in the
process of, and activities associated with, conducting transactions of
commodities. 2 With respect to criminal regulation, the Commerce Clause
extended to acts interfering with, obstructing, or preventing the exercise of
power to regulate commerce and navigation among the several states.33 The
32 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824). New York passed and amended an act that
granted R. R. Livingston and Robert Fulton exclusive license to operate steam boats in New
York waterways. This monopoly was to run for thirty years, beginning in 1808. Id. at 6-7.
Aaron Ogden acquired title to this exclusive license from Livingston and Fulton and
operated a ferry service between New Jersey and New York. Id. at 7. In 1818, Ogden filed
an injunction against Thomas Gibbons, who had begun to operate a competing ferry service
without license in violation of Ogden's exclusive right. Id. at 1, 6-8. Gibbons argued that
"the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed" under a federal act "for
enrolling and licensing ships and vessels ... in the coasting trade . I..." d  at 2. Chief
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, held that Congress had power, conferred through
the Commerce Clause, to regulate ferries on navigable waterways. ld. at 190. Mimicking
Hamilton's remarks in The Federalist No. I/, Marshall saw "commerce" as "intercourse
between nations, and parts of nations." Id. at 189-90; see THE FEDERALIST No. 11, at 57
(Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
33 United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72, 78 (1838). The Supreme Court allowed
Congress to criminalize activity that acts as an obstruction to the channels of commerce. See
id. at 79 ("[D]oes [the statute] mean ... to prohibit and punish such plunder, stealing, or
destroying of. . . property; whether the act be done on shore, or in any of the enumerated
places below high water mark. In our opinion, the latter is the true interpretation of this
clause of the section."). In Champion v. Ames, the Court held constitutional the
criminalization of the sale of lottery tickets using interstate channels on the ground that
articles of traffic, such as lottery tickets, are articles of commerce. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
The Champion Court rejected an argument that Congress may only regulate and not prohibit.
Id. But see Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (distinguishing between regulating
commerce and regulating the movement of commerce). Ten years later in Hoke &
Economides v. United States, the Court analogized the transport of prostitutes to the
transport of lottery tickets and held that Congress had authority to criminalize the transport
of prostitutes across state lines. 227 U.S. 308 (1913); see Caminetti v. United States, 242
U.S. 470 (1917). The Court stated "that Congress has power over transportation among the
several states" and application of this power "may have the quality of police regulations."
Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 492 (internal quotations omitted); Hoke, 227 U.S. at 323 (internal
quotations omitted). Ironically, commentators now argue that many of the early twentieth
century pre-New Deal cases placed artificial constraints on Congressional Commerce Clause
powers. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556 (1995); Nelson & Pushaw, supra




power decreased just prior to the turn of the century with the passing of the
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of
1890. 34 The Court began distinguishing between activities involving
mining, manufacturing, or agriculture and those involving commerce,
extending Congressional lawmaking authority to the latter but not the
former.35  During this time, the Court also experimented with drawing
Commerce Clause distinctions between those regulations having direct
effects on commerce and those having indirect effects.3 6 In 1937, after a
period during which the Court rejected a series of New Deal regulations
designed to stimulate the economy out of the Depression, the Court
abandoned these formal tests, 37 replacing them with a deferential approach
to Commerce Clause challenges that effectively granted Congress plenary
regulatory authority. 38 Although this change was rooted in regulation
designed to stimulate the economy, Congress soon branched out into realms
traditionally left for state legislation and enforcement, particularly criminal
34 Sherman Anti-Trust Act of 1890 §§ 1-7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2003); Interstate
Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (2003).
35 See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
36 See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935);
Houston E. & W. Railroad Co. v. United States (The Shreveport Rates Cases), 234 U.S. 342
(1914).
37 While President Roosevelt threatened to pack the Court with Justices willing to find
his policies constitutional, the existing Court replaced the restrictive interpretation of the
Commerce Clause with an almost plenary power interpretation. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 187 (1997). Compare JOSEPH ALSOP &
TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS 135, 140 (1937) (positing that Justice Roberts's "switch
in time" from the conservative faction of the Court to the liberal wing occurred before the
President's Court-Packing Plan was announced), with MERLO J. PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT
CRISIS (1937) (arguing that the Court-Packing Plan had intimidated Justice Roberts into
reversing his voting trend from conservative to liberal). See generally Michael Ariens, A
Thrice-Told Tale, or Felix the Cat, 107 HARV. L. REv. 620, 630-31 (1994).
38 In Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court held that the
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, which gives employees rights to organize unions and
restricts employer freedoms, was constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 301 U.S. 1, 30
(1937). In so holding, the Court stated that "[i]t is the effect upon commerce, not the source
of the injury, which is the criterion" for determining Commerce Clause constitutionality. Id.
at 32. The Court solidified this "effect upon commerce" review in United States v. Darby, in
which legislation regulating labor hours and wages was held constitutional. 312 U.S. 100,
115, 119 (1941). In "perhaps the most far reaching example of Commerce Clause authority
over intrastate activity," United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995), the Wickard v.
Filburn Court upheld as constitutional the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938, which
limited the amount of wheat that farmers could produce in a given season. 317 U.S. I11,
115 (1942); see Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 § 331, 7 U.S.C. § 1331 (2003). Farmer
Roscoe Filburn was found liable under the Act, even though he overproduced wheat for
personal consumption and with no intent to sell. See Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125, 127-29
(holding that "[h]omegrown wheat.., competes with wheat in commerce").
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law.39  But in 1995, the Rehnquist Court ended the ever-expanding
Congressional Commerce Clause power in Lopez,40 a challenge to the Gun
Free School Zones Act (GFSZA) of 1990.41
A. THE RETURN OF THE RESTRICTIVE COMMERCE CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE THROUGH CRIMINAL LAW ADJUDICATION
After Chief Justice Rehnquist's tenure on the Supreme Court has
expired, his Court may be best remembered for its work in effectively
crafting the first limitations imposed on Congressional Commerce Clause
power since before World War 11,42 thereby resurrecting federalism
principles extinguished when the New Deal Court interpreted the Clause as
a grant of virtual plenary power.43 These limitations were first articulated in
Lopez. On March 10, 1992, twelfth-grader Alfonzo Lopez arrived at his
San Antonio, Texas high school carrying a .38-caliber gun and bullets.44
Due to an anonymous tip, Lopez was confronted by school officials, and he
admitted to possessing the weapon.45  Charges under Texas state law for
possession of the weapon were filed but subsequently dropped in lieu of
federal charges per the GFSZA.46  The statute made an individual's
knowing possession of a firearm in a school zone a federal offense.
47
The Court's decision, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist, categorized
all Congressional powers conveyed by the Commerce Clause. Congress
may regulate the channels of commerce, the instrumentalities of
commercial channels, and purely intrastate "activities that substantially
39 See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 3, at 88 (arguing that the Substantial Effects Factor,
which was first stated in Darby, allowed for significant Congressional expansion into
criminal law legislation); Andrew St. Laurent, Reconstituting United States v. Lopez:
Another Look at Federal Criminal Law, 31 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBs. 61, 83 (1997)
(arguing the same). For examples of such a federal regulation, see United States v. Perez,
402 U.S. 146, 147, n.1 (1971) (citing Title 11 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1964,
18 U.S.C §§ 891-896 (2003)). See also Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941 (2004) (citing
18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (1986)).
40 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S 549 (1995).
41 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2003).
42 See, e.g., Choper, supra note 8, at 793 (positing that the Rehnquist Court's "defining
issue" has been its federalism decisions restricting congressional Commerce Clause
authority).
43 See generally Hon. Alex Kozinski, Introduction to Volume Nineteen, 19 Harv. J.L. &
Pub. Pol'y 1, 5 (1996) (referring to post-New Deal Commerce Clause as the "Hey, you-can-
do-whatever-you-feel-like Clause").
44 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551.
45 Id.
46 id.
47 Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (2003).
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affect interstate commerce. 4 8 Not having any connection to either the
channels or the instrumentalities of commerce, the GFSZA could only be
upheld upon a showing that the prohibited activity substantially affected
interstate commerce. The Court noted that all regulation found
constitutional by the Court substantially affecting interstate commerce was
economic in nature. 49 Thus, a limiting principle could be applied to the
third category of Commerce Clause power: Congress may regulate
economic activity that has a substantial affect on interstate commerce.50
Finding no regulation of any economic activity within the text of the
GFSZA, and rebuffing the government's argument that the effects of guns
near school zones are sufficiently related to general economic harm to
society, the Court rejected the GFSZA as unconstitutional on Commerce
Clause grounds." In concurrence, Justices Kennedy and O'Connor looked
to federalism principles for support.5 2  Rather than apply the formula
created by the majority opinion, the two Justices advocated an inquiry into
whether the activity at issue was traditionally regulated by the States.53
Five years later, again in an opinion authored by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, the Court in Morrison 4 further defined the boundary of the
Commerce Clause. In that case, a female student accused two football
players at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute of rape. 5 The female student
filed a complaint under the Violence Against Women's Act (VAWA),
which created a private right of action for female victims of violence
against their assailants.5 6 The Court began by categorizing the VAWA
under the Substantial Effects Category of Lopez, 7 assigning four factors for
review: (1) whether the regulation involves "economic activity," (2)
48 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
49 Id. at 560.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 561 (holding that "§ 922(q) is a criminal statute that by its terms has nothing to
do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however broadly one might define
those terms") (emphasis added). In arriving at this decision, the Chief Justice found support
in the longstanding reservation of criminal lawmaking authority to the states. Id. at 561 n.3.
52 Id. at 580 (Kennedy & O'Connor, J.J., concurring).
53 Id. (Kennedy & O'Connor, J.J., concurring).
5 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
I d. at 602-03.
56 Id. at 604-05; see Bradley, supra note 8, at 573 ("Morrison arose from a civil suit
under the [VAWA] .... "). The VAWA states that "[a] person ... who commits a crime of
violence motivated by gender ... shall be liable to the party injured, in an action for the
recovery of compensatory and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief, and such
other relief as a court may deem appropriate." Violence Against Women Act of 1994 §
40302, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (2003).
57 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608-09.
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whether a jurisdictional element limits the regulation's application, (3)
whether existing legislative intent is rational, and (4) whether the regulation
has more than an attenuated effect on interstate commerce.58
Notwithstanding voluminous evidence presented by Congress that violence
against women creates a significant pecuniary cost for society, the Court
held that the VAWA involved no economic activity and was consequently
unconstitutional.9
In both cases, the Court emphasized that this seemingly new limitation
on Commerce Clause power was not tantamount to a blanket reversal of the
past fifty years' jurisprudence.60 Instead, the Court imposed a limiting
principle on the meaning of commerce, one that had arguably been implied
throughout Commerce Clause history. Legislation regulating economic
activity that substantially affects interstate commerce will be sustained as
constitutional.61 Furthermore, deference to Congressional findings
regarding the effects on commerce of noneconomic activity is alone
insufficient to show economic activity.62 All regulations that directly affect
economic activities and even some regulations of noneconomic activities
are constitutional.63
58 Id. at 609-13 (summarizing the framework initially reviewed in Lopez).
'9 Id. at617.
60 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995) (holding that all past precedent,
including Wickard, is distinguishable from this case); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 608 (discussing
the same).
61 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
62 See McGinnis, supra note 3, at 514; Bradley, supra note 8, at 610 ("[I]t is neither
necessary nor dispositive for the statute to contain ... a congressional finding of an effect on
commerce, though [this is] helpful.").
63 This past term, the Court again reviewed, albeit briefly, whether a federal criminal law
withstood the Lopez/Morrison Commerce Clause rubric. In Sabri v. United States, the Court
reviewed whether Congress possesses the authority to pass 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2), which
criminalizes bribery in excess of $5,000 of any governmental agent or organization. 124 S.
Ct. 1941, 1944-45 (2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) (1986)). In response to Basim
Sabri's contention that § 666(a)(2) violates Congressional Commerce Clause authority, as
defined by Lopez and Morrison, the Court held that those "precedents do not control here."
Id. at 1947. The Court noted that the statutes held to be unconstitutional in Lopez and
Morrison had "nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms." Id. (internal quotations omitted). In contrast, the
Court held that Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause "to protect spending
objectives from the menace of local administrators on the take." Id. Thus, unlike the
GFSZA and the VAWA, the statutes held to be unconstitutional in Lopez and Morrison,
respectively, Congress has the authority under the Commerce Clause to pass § 666(a)(2),
which has a substantial effect on commerce and is inextricably linked to spending. See id.




B. TREATMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, AS OBSERVED
THROUGH REGULATION OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY, ABORTION
CLINIC PROTECTIONS, AND MACHINEGUN POSSESSION
While the Commerce Clause original intent debate raged, a significant
problem brewed in the lower courts. 64 The Supreme Court imposed
limitations on the Commerce Clause by reviewing two criminal suits.
6
Implicitly, this conveyed a message to Congress that the bounds of its
Commerce Clause authority are so broad that only regulation of activity so
unconnected to commerce as to never be deemed commercial is
unconstitutional.66 But lower courts are now trying to mold the contours of
the "economic criminal conduct. 67 The courts have resultantly conflicted
regarding whether various federal laws are constitutional, particularly child
pornography laws, abortion clinic protections, and machinegun possession
laws, all discussed below.
1. The Child Pornography Backdrop Through the Kallestad and McCoy
Courts
Child pornography laws have been included in chapters of the U.S.
Code designed to protect children from abuse.68 In 1978, the Committee on
the Judiciary and the Committee on Human Resources were confronted
with the following conclusions from staff investigations:
[C]hild pornography and child prostitution have become highly organized,
multimillion dollar industries that operate on a nationwide scale[;] the use of children
as ... the subjects of pornographic materials is very harmful to both the children and
the society as a whole[;] ... the sale and distribution of such pornographic materials
are carried on to a substantial extent through the mails and other instrumentalities of
interstate and foreign commerce[;] and . . . existing federal laws [prior to 1977]
64 Cf Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 3, at 93 (noting the "avalanche of litigation in the
lower federal courts" since Lopez); St. Laurent, supra note 39, at 88 ("The reactions of the
lower federal courts to Lopez have been somewhat mixed .... ").
65 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551 (GFSZA); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 601 (VAWA).
66 See sources cited supra note 24.
67 Compare Reynolds & Denning, supra note 24, at 392 (arguing that lower court
inconsistency in applying Lopez is due to ambiguity in the decision), with Brannon P.
Denning & Glenn H. Reynolds, Rulings and Resistance: The New Commerce Clause
Jurisprudence Encounters the Lower Courts, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1253, 1256 (2003) ("The more
strenuously the courts resist the implementation of Lopez and its progeny, the more it begins
to look as if the [lower] courts simply disagree with the results.").
6' See 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (2003). This section is contained in chapter 110, entitled
"Sexual Exploitation and Other Abuse of Children."
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dealing with prostitution and pornography do not protect against the use of children in
these activities and that specific legislation in this area is both advisable and needed.
69
With this showing, 18 U.S.C. § 2252 was enacted, prohibiting the transport,
purchase, sale, or possession of any depiction of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit activity.7"
Among recent constitutional attacks against 18 U.S.C. § 2252 was the
Fifth Circuit's review of § 2252(a)(4)(B) in United States v. Kallestad .7
Charles Kallestad was discovered possessing a substantial quantity of nude
photographs and movies of women, some of whom appeared to be minors.
72
He met many of these girls after advertising in the local newspaper for
"slender female nude models," and had stated in several of these
advertisements that age was irrelevant.7 3 Of those who responded, some
were as young as sixteen or seventeen, a fact about which Kallestad was
aware. 74  Kallestad was convicted on six counts of violating §
2252(a)(4)(B).75
The Fifth Circuit systematically reviewed the four-part test created in
Morrison, after summarily determining that § 2252(a)(4)(B) could only be
upheld under the Substantial Effects Category of Lopez.76 The court
distinguished § 2252(a)(4)(B) from the GFSZA to interpret the law as a
regulation of an economic activity.77 Recognizing that mere possession of
this pornographic material is inherently different than the trade of the same
material, the court analogized homemade child pornography to Farmer
69 See S. REP. No. 95-438, at 5 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 42-43.
Although displaying concern regarding encroachment upon state police power, Congress
was "convinced that the use of children in the production of pornographic material is a
matter that cannot be adequately controlled by state and local authorities" alone. Id. at 10.
Among the most startling evidence of this problem's magnitude was the research of Robin
Lloyd, who had discovered over 260 unique periodicals depicting minors engaged in
sexually explicit conduct. Id. at 5.
70 18 U.S.C. § 2252 (pertaining to "[c]ertain activities relating to material involving the
sexual exploitation of minors").
"t 236 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 2000). Subsection (B) states that anyone who "knowingly
possesses I or more books, magazines, periodicals, films, video tapes, or other matter which
contain any visual depiction ... transported in interstate or foreign commerce, or which was
produced using materials . . . [so] transported . . . shall be punished . . ." if "such visual
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct." 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B).




76 See id. at 228-29.
77 Id. at 228 (distinguishing § 2252(a)(4)(B) from the GFSZA).
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Filburn's home-grown wheat at issue in Wickard v. Filburn.78 The court
held that production of a good for which a liquid market exists, such as the
wheat and child pornography markets, is economic and commercial in
character in the aggregate, even when particular quantities are produced for
personal consumption.79  As a result, the Fifth Circuit found §
2252(a)(4)(B) constitutional under the Commerce Clause. 0
Three years later in United States v. McCoy,8" the Ninth Circuit
reviewed § 2252(a)(4)(B). Jonathan and Rhonda McCoy, parents of a ten-
year-old girl and twenty-month-old son, were at home with their children
preparing for Easter.82 Rhonda, who was disposed to heavy alcohol use,
was photographed next to her daughter while both were exposing their
genitals. 83 The film developer discovered the photograph.8 4 Jonathan was
acquitted of all charges brought under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(b), a statute that
prohibits the manufacture by a parent of child pornography with materials
that were transported through interstate commerce. Rhonda, however, was
charged with possession of the photograph per § 2252(a)(4)(B)."5
The court systematically reviewed the four elements defined in
Morrison and concluded that the law was unconstitutionally applied to
McCoy.8 6 With respect to whether the activity was economic in nature, the
78 See id.; Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); supra note 38 (discussing Wickard).
79 Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 228. The majority's reasoning was recently followed by the
Second Circuit reviewing United States v. Holston, another 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) suit
with similar facts. See 343 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003) (addressing the constitutionality of §
2252(a)(4)(B) when Holston was found possessing pornographic material depicting a ten-
year-old girl and a thirteen-year-old girl who lived in a neighboring apartment).
'o Kallestad, 236 F.3d at 23 1.
SI 323 F.3d 1114 (2003).
82 Id. at 1115.
83 id.
84 id.
" Id. at 1116.
86 Id. at 1119-33. Suppose that a person is charged with violating a federal criminal
statute. Among his strategic alternatives to avoid conviction is to assert an affirmative
defense that the law is inapplicable, despite admission that his actions would make him
liable under the law. If reviewed on constitutional grounds, this inapplicability can be
asserted in one of two ways. The law may be an impermissible application of the
lawmaker's authority to pass law, or the law may be permissible but does not
constitutionally apply to the circumstances in the particular suit. The former is dubbed a
"facial challenge" and the latter an "as-applied challenge." See United States v. Salerno, 481
U.S. 739, 745 (1987) (permitting as-applied constitutional challenges); Peter J. Henning,
Misguided Federalism, 68 Mo. L. REV. 389, 431-32 (2003) (distinguishing facial challenges
from as-applied challenges). Compare Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As-Applied and Facial
Challenges and Third-Party Standing, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1321 (2000) (finding applications
and limitations for both facial and as-applied challenges), with Matthew D. Adler, Rights,
Rules, and the Structure of Constitutional Adjudication: A Response to Professor Fallon,
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court disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's Wickard analysis and analogized
personal possession of child pornography to the noneconomic activity in
87Lopez and Morrison. However, rather than hold § 2252(a)(4)(B) facially
unconstitutional, the court held "the statute [unconstitutional] as applied to
McCoy's conduct as it falls within a class of activity that § 2252(a)(4)(B)
purports to reach."88 Thus, the majority found McCoy not liable without
expressly rejecting the statute.89  The Ninth Circuit's treatment of §
2252(a)(4)(B), finding the statute constitutional except for in instances
when the criminal defendant acted similar to how McCoy acted, is directly
related to the court's application of the as-applied doctrine.90
2. FACE Act and the Bird Decisions
In August 2003, the Southern District of Texas applied Morrison to the
Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances (FACE) Act.9' The FACE Act
criminalizes activity construed as both "intentionally injur[ing],
intimidat[ing], or interfer[ing] ... with any person because that person is or
has been ... obtaining or providing reproductive health services" as well as
"intentionally damag[ing] or destroy[ing] the property of a facility... [that]
113 HARV. L. REV. 1371 (2000) (responding to Prof. Fallon by asserting that personal rights
are not violated despite the use of invalid rules). Facial challenges restrict courts to judging
the constitutionality of statutes on the whole. Professor Peter J. Henning notes that only two
types of facial challenges exist, those under the Overbreadth Doctrine, which prohibits
statutes that impermissibly infringe on First Amendment free speech rights, and those under
the "valid rule" claim. See Henning, supra, at 431-32 (citing Henry Paul Monaghan,
Overbreadth, 1981 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (1981)). The "valid rule claim" is a doctrine stating
that litigants are entitled to be judged per a constitutional rule of law and that rules beyond
the lawmaker's authority are unenforceable. See id. at 432-33. In contrast, as-applied
challenges grant power to the courts to judge constitutionality on a case-by-case basis.
87 See McCoy, 323 F.3d. at 1120-23 (distinguishing McCoy's private possession with
Wickard's possession of home-grown wheat that reduced market demand and had a
corresponding effect on price).
88 Id. at 1132.
'9 See id. at 1132-33. In so holding, the majority highlights that sister circuits have
similarly attacked 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) on as-applied grounds. Id. at 1130 n.28 (citing
United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 329 (6th Cir. 2001)); see Henning, supra note 86, at
438-39 (discussing how the Corp court upheld § 2252(a)(4)(B) as a valid application of
Commerce Clause power, yet found that the statute could not be applied to the defendant).
Unlike the Fifth Circuit in Kallestad and the Second Circuit in Holston, neither the Sixth
Circuit in Corp nor the Ninth Circuit in McCoy held the rule to be an invalid application of
Commerce Clause power. Rather, these courts held that principles of federalism required the
defendants to be found not guilty despite the law. See Henning, supra note 86.
90 For an explanation of what caused the conflict between the Fifth Circuit's Kallestad
decision and the Ninth Circuit's McCoy decision, see infra text accompanying notes 105-17.
9' Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
1119
PAUL TZUR
provides reproductive health services. 9  In 1994, Frank Bird, a known
radical pro-life activist, threw a bottle at the windshield of a car driven by
an abortion provider driving into the parking lot of the America's Women
Clinic in Houston. 93 Bird was arrested, charged with, and convicted of
violating § 248(a). 94  He raised a defense that the FACE Act was an
unconstitutional use of Congress's Commerce Clause power.95 The Fifth
Circuit applied the newly created Lopez test and held that § 248(a) could
only survive a Commerce Clause attack upon satisfaction of the Substantial
Effects Category.96 The Fifth Circuit's decision in this case came three
years before Morrison, meaning that the court did not have the benefit of
the Supreme Court's express adoption of the Economic Activity Test and
rejection of such heavy reliance on Congressional findings.97 However, the
Lopez Court noted the relationship between economic activity statutes
deemed constitutional; 98 the Fifth Circuit interpreted this language to mean
that findings of Congress of the economic consequences of criminal
behavior are sufficient. The court held, supported by Congressional
findings of the economic impact of violence near abortion clinics, that §
248(a) "is a legitimate regulation of intrastate activity having a substantial
affect on interstate commerce." 99  Bird served a year in prison for his
actions.0
In March 2003, Bird drove a van into the front entrance of a Houston
Planned Parenthood Clinic, again in violation of § 248(a).' 01 Bird, who
again asserted a defense that the FACE Act is unconstitutional, was tried in
the Southern District of Texas.10 2  Similar to the evidence Congress
presented to support the VAWA, evidence was presented of the economic
9' 18 U.S.C. § 248(a).
93 United States v. Bird (Bird 1), No. 95-20792, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *2-*3
(5th Cir. Sept. 24, 1997); see Eric Lichtblau, Ashcroft to Defend Ban on Some Abortion
Protests, Angering His Longtime Allies, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at A12 (noting repeated
arrests of Mr. Bird in Houston throughout the past decade).
9' See Bird !, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *2.
9' Id. at *7.
96 Id. at *19 (summarizing the Act's failure to qualify as constitutional under the first two
Lopez prongs).
97 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 610, 614 (2000).
98 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 560 (1995).
99 Bird!, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *28.
'00 Id. at *3.
'0' See United States v. Bird (Bird I1), 279 F. Supp. 2d. 827 (S.D. Tex. 2003); S.K.
Bardwell, Charges Against Abortion Protester Dismissed, THE HOUSTON CHRON., Aug. 20,
2003, at A23 ("Bird, a well-known abortion protester, told authorities he conducted the crash
to 'stop the killing."').
102 Bird H, 279 F. Supp. 2d. at 828.
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and commercial impact of intimidation tactics used by anti-abortion
protestors at clinics.1°3 Buoyed by the Morrison decision, the District Court
analogized this evidence to the evidence of the economic impact of gender
abuse in support of the VAWA. Relying on the Morrison Court's holding
that evidence of an activity's economic effects on society is alone
inadequate to find that activity "economic," the District Court decided that
the evidence of societal economic effects of violence at abortion clinics
alone was insufficient to satisfy Substantial Effects. 10 4 Even though the
Fifth Circuit, in an almost identical fact pattern concerning the same
defendant, held that the FACE Act is a constitutional application of the
Commerce Clause, the Southern District of Texas, jurisdictionally bound by
Fifth Circuit precedent, found the FACE Act facially unconstitutional.'0 °
Yet Morrison restated the limitations provided in Lopez, upon which the
Fifth Circuit based its Bird I decision in 1997. Additionally, the Fifth
Circuit had not been mute on Commerce Clause issues since Morrison,
deciding Kallestad in reliance upon that decision. Thus, the Southern
District decided Bird II against both the Fifth Circuit's Bird I precedent and
precedent created in reliance on Morrison. 1
6
Thus far, two splits regarding federal statute constitutionality have
been highlighted. One involves regulating mere possession of "home-
grown" pornography, and one involves regulation of entrances to abortion
clinics. The limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed by this
paper requires that, to regulate economic activity, a law must either directly
affect or have the purpose of directly affecting a valuable transaction. The
Kallestad Court, by relying entirely on Congressional findings, held that 18
103 Id. at 836-37; see also Bird 1, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *29-*30 (relying
significantly on Congressional findings in order to uphold FACE as constitutional). Note
that unlike the Fifth Circuit, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas had the
benefit of the standards provided in Morrison to aid in the constitutionality issue.
104 See Bird I, 279 F. Supp. 2d. at 836 ("Simply because Congress may conclude that a
particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce does not necessarily make it so."
(quoting United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000))).
105 Bird I, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *28; Bird II, 279 F. Supp. 2d. at 837-38
(finding no broader economic regulation using the FACE, "no rational basis for finding that
a substantial relationship exists between the regulated activity and commerce," and "no
intrastate commercial activity generated by the anti-abortion activities that arguably
generates funds for other criminal activity that is interstate in nature").
1o6 Aside from the jurisprudential chaos currently existing, the effects of Bird H have also
been political. Attorney General John Ashcroft has announced intentions to appeal the
Southern District's decision, threatening to alienate social conservatives from whom both
Ashcroft and the Republican Party have received support. See Lichtblau, supra note 93.
Ashcroft defended his stance, stating that he "well understand[s] that the role of attorney
general is to enforce the law as it is, not as [he] would have it." Id.
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U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) was a regulation of economic activity, °7 an analysis
explicitly rejected in Morrison.108 The McCoy Court found no economic
activity in the defendant's possession of homemade child pornography,
since McCoy's picture did not affect demand in the child pornography
market.'0 9 The Fifth Circuit in Bird I decided that the FACE Act is a
"legitimate regulation of intrastate activity having a substantial affect on
interstate commerce" based entirely upon Congressional findings."0 Yet
the Bird II Court, rejecting the sufficiency of Congressional findings, stated
that the FACE Act was not a regulation of economic activity."'
Two causes for the circuit splits are evident. First, both the Lopez and
Morrison majority opinions reflect the Chief Justice's terse writing style,
which had the effect here of creating enormous room for interpretive
variance. Lopez and Morrison may be read, for instance, to only apply to
laws so ridiculously unrelated to commerce that the Court cannot remain
mute. Even more broadly interpreted, the Court's reliance on case-by-case
adjudication may reflect a wish to limit the cases to their facts. Most likely,
however, the Chief Justice wrote the opinions with so much interpretive
room in order to retain his majority."2 The Kallestad, McCoy, Bird I, and
Bird H Courts were all structurally consistent with Lopez, and even though
the Bird II Court stated otherwise, all the courts including Bird I were
structurally consistent with Morrison as well. Unfortunately, the
interpretive "wiggle room" has allowed the lower courts to ignore the
purpose of Lopez and Morrison, which impose an outer bound on
Congressional Commerce Clause power.' 13
Second, the Supreme Court used criminal cases to state the Economic
Activity limitation on the Substantial Effects Category, an awkward mode
107 See United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 228 (5th Cir. 2000) (relying on the 1986
Attorney General Commission on Pornography, stating "much of the interstate traffic in
child pornography involves photographs taken by child abusers themselves, and then either
kept or informally distributed to other child abusers").
108 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 ("[T]he existence of congressional findings is not
sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause legislation.").
'09 See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2003) ("The picture..
which McCoy possessed for her own personal use did not 'compete' with other depictions.
' in the illicit market for child pornography and did not affect their availability or price.").
The court also rejected four arguments posed by the Third Circuit. See id. at 1121-22
(quoting United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465, 477-78 (3d Cir. 1999)).
1'0 See Bird 1, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *28.
. See United States v. Bird (Bird If), 279 F. Supp. 2d. 827, 837 (S.D. Tex. 2003).
112 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 580 (1995) (Kennedy and O'Connor, J.J.,
concurring) (opining a review of traditional state functions).
1'3 See Denning & Reynolds, supra note 67, at 1299-1303.
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at best by which to check the Commerce Clause power Congress wields. 14
The tests were articulated in criminal law suits in order to send the message
that Congressional Commerce Clause authority is vast. Conceptually, a
sphere of authority exists within which Congress, at a minimum, has
regulatory power over transactions, contracts, and general trade. Congress
has incentives to seek a much larger sphere, one maximizing its political
power. Lopez and Morrison provide evidence of an outer limit-a
maximum size-for the sphere. However, whether Congress has authority
up to the limits imposed by these two cases, or whether the cases fall
substantially beyond the regulatory sphere's outer bound remains unknown.
With regard to deciding this question, many of the lower courts have been
deferential to Congressional authority."' However Congress, which wants
maximum political authority, is not appropriately situated to dictate the
outer bound of its own Commerce Clause power. To think otherwise
contradicts the express intent of the Framers!"
l6
More importantly, those courts that have disagreed with Congress have
applied arbitrary tests, with neither support for their validity nor explanation
of their operation."' These arbitrary measures violate the judiciary's need
for the rule of law to be paramount to other interests, like fairness and
societal optimality, goals best advanced by the other branches of
1"4 See Bradley, supra note 8, at 575-76 ("[I]t appears that the Court's goal is to rein in
federal jurisdiction in cases where the Court's majority deems it unnecessary to the principal
purposes and goals of federal law enforcement while not disturbing the government's ability
to vindicate its key concerns."). But cf McGinnis, supra note 3, at 518-19. Prof. McGinnis
gives two alternative explanations for the Court's decision to create Commerce Clause limits
through criminal law. First, too much precedent exists for the Court to impose a sudden
return to the pre-New Deal restrictive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. See id. at 518
(citing Prof. Robert Bork, "hardly a friend of New Deal jurisprudence, [who] has stated, to
overturn the precedent on Congress's regulatory authority over economic matters would be
'to overturn much of modem governance and plunge us into chaos"'). Second, Commerce
Clause limits may be imposed on Congress through noneconomic criminal matters with less
controversy, "thus creating fewer political risks for the Supreme Court." See id. at 519
("Relatively few people are going to march to the barricades over the gun carrying law at
issue in Lopez or even the gender discrimination law at issue in Morrison. Thus, a
fundamental explanation for the Court's creation of space for noneconomic civic society is
that it is simply an easier political task.").
1'5 E.g., United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2003); United States v.
Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 229 (5th Cir. 2000); Bird 1, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988, at *31.
'16 See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1999).
117 See United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (applying an "effect
on demand" test to determine that McCoy's photograph did not "compete" in the child
pornography market and was thus "was purely non-economic and non-commercial"). For a
thorough analysis regarding the causes of lower court application of arbitrary rules and quick
abdication to Congress, see Denning & Reynolds, supra note 67, at 1299-1303.
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government. "8 For instance, the McCoy Court explained that the
defendant's photograph did not "compete" in the larger, national child
pornography market.'" 9 Yet the question raised by the Commerce Clause
challenge is whether the law is constitutional, not whether regulation of the
particular defendant's activity under the purview of the law is
constitutional. Furthermore, how one is to determine in the Ninth Circuit,
after McCoy, whether a particular good or activity "competes" in the
national market remains a mystery. After a review of one additional statute
is undertaken, this paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation will be
used to clear the murk.
3. The Constitutionality of Prohibiting the Creation of Home-Grown
Machine Guns and United States v. Stewart120
Robert Stewart, who had previously been convicted of possession and
trade of illegal firearms, advertised the sale of machinegun components in
national publications. 12 1  Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives
(ATF) agents, based on these advertisements and undercover operations,
searched Stewart's home and found thirty-one firearms, which included five
homemade machineguns. 22 Stewart was charged and convicted of trading
machinegun components as well as possessing machineguns. 23 Stewart, on
appeal to the Ninth Circuit, challenged his conviction for possession of his
homemade machineguns per 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) on grounds that Congress
is without the authority to regulate mere possession of machineguns.124
The Ninth Circuit first reviewed the Lopez factors and determined that
§ 922(o) could only be constitutional by having a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. 25 Then, applying the four Morrison factors, the court
118 See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175,
1175-76 (1989).
'" See McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1122.
120 348 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 2003).
121 Id. at 1133.
22 Id. at 1133-34 ("In addition to numerous rifle kits, the ATF search also turned up
thirty-one firearms, including five machineguns. The machineguns had been machined and
assembled by Stewart.").
'23 Id. at 1134. Section 922(o) simply states that "it shall be unlawful for any person to
transfer or possess a machinegun." 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (2003).
124 See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1134; 18 U.S.C. § 922(o). Stewart was not charged with
advertising his parts kits, and he did not challenge Congressional authority to regulate the
transfer of machineguns. Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1134.
25 See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1134. The court had to limit a prior post-Lopez decision,
which held § 922(o) constitutional under the "channel of commerce" prong of Lopez. In
United States v. Rambo, the court held that § 922(o) is constitutional, relying on an
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analogized Stewart's possession of the machineguns to Lopez's possession
of the gun on school grounds, finding that § 922(o) similarly lacked any
regulation of an economic activity. 126 The court followed the analysis in
McCoy, stating that "Stewart's homemade machineguns did not stimulate a
demand for anything illegal[,] ... did not increase machinegun demand,"
and did not reduce overall demand in the machinegun market.1 27 The court
also distinguished Wickard, stating that the no evidence was presented that
the regulation had more than an attenuated connection to interstate
commerce. 28 The court went further, stating that the purpose of the
regulation was not economic. 129  Yet rather than find § 922(o) facially
unconstitutional, the court held that the statute was unconstitutionally
applied to Stewart, parroting the approach taken by the McCoy majority.13
The Stewart Court adopted two of the same devices that the McCoy
Court had used six months earlier. The court used the effects on market
demand as an indicator of economic activity and also decided that § 922(o)
was unconstitutional as applied to Stewart. 31 But unlike the McCoy Court,
this court took a substantial step toward adjudicating the Economic Activity
Test in a principled manner akin to what is proposed here. The court
determined that the prohibition on machinegun possession per § 922(o)
does not regulate economic activity.'32 This is the first prong of this paper's
assumption that "a transfer or sale must have preceded the criminalized possession" of the
prohibited firearm. Id. at 1134 (citing United States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996)).
126 See id. at 1137-39 (holding that, like the GFSZA, § 922(q) in Lopez, § 922(o) lacked
any relationship to commerce or economic enterprise, however broadly those terms may be
defined).
127 See id. at 1138; United States v. McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003).
28 Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137 ("Unlike in Wickard..., where growing wheat in one's
backyard could be seen as a means of saving money that would otherwise have been spent in
the open market, a homemade machinegun may be part of a gun collection or may be crafted
as a hobby.") (emphasis added).
129 Id. (stating that § 922(o) was likely "intended to keep machineguns out of the hands
of criminals-an admirable goal, but not a commercial one").
30 Id. at 1140 ("We therefore conclude that § 922(o) is unconstitutional as applied to
Stewart."). Compare McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1129, 1133 ("[A] thorough review of the Morrison
factors persuades us that, as applied to McCoy and others similarly situated, § 2252(a)(4)(B)
cannot be upheld as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause power."), with McCoy, 323
F.3d at 1133 (Trott, J., dissenting) (arguing that "the Supreme Court appears ... to have
ruled out 'as applied' challenges in Commerce Clause cases"), and Sabri v. United States,
124 S. Ct. 1941, 1949 (2004) (Kennedy & Scalia, J.J., concurring in part) (opining that
Lopez and Morrison only provide for facial challenges).
131 Parallel to the McCoy Court's decision, the Stewart Court avoided deciding whether
18 U.S.C. § 922(o) is facially unconstitutional.
132 See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137 (stating that "[p]ossession of a machinegun is not,
without more, economic in nature").
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limited Economic Activity Test interpretation, which states that a regulation
must directly affect a valuable transaction to be a regulation of an economic
activity. The court did not need to say more than that the regulation was
not economic, since no valuable transfer is required by the statute.
Moreover, the Stewart Court also reviewed the purpose of the regulation,
stating that "the regulation itself does not have an economic purpose.' 33
This is the second prong of this paper's Economic Activity Test
interpretation, which states that a regulation of a noneconomic activity must
have the purpose of directly affecting a valuable transaction to be
constitutional. The structure of and justifications for this paper's limited
Economic Activity interpretation are discussed at length next.
III. REFINING MORRISON'S ECONOMIC ACTIVITY TEST
A problem obviously exists with the current structure for adjudicating
Commerce Clause attacks. The circuit courts have implemented Lopez and
Morrison with unique and diverse constructs; the only common thread is a
universal refusal to find any statute facially unconstitutional. The onus for
consistent and principled application of the Supreme Court's interpretive
shift in Commerce Clause doctrine'34 falls squarely with the appellate
courts. So why should this paper's limited Economic Activity
interpretation be considered any better than the others? After all, a number
of useful and socially beneficial laws may be deemed unconstitutional
under this interpretation. As an underlying motive for the paper, adherence
to, and application of, the rule of law is considered paramount to all other
judicial interests, such as fairness to individual defendants and societal
optimality. The limited Economic Activity interpretation provides a
robotic, unswerving test for Commerce Clause adjudication by the lower
courts and also demarks a bound on the Congressional authoritative sphere
consistent with Lopez and Morrison. This section is devoted to explaining
the interpretation's merits over alternatives in addition to validating the
interpretation through the use of past precedent.
... See id.
134 Compare Thomas W. Merrill, Toward a Principled Interpretation of the Commerce
Clause, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 31, 39 (1998) (arguing for a Congressional Intent Test,
determining the motives of the legislature for the law, as a substitute for an effects test), with
Regan, supra note 20, at 609 (construing the enumerated powers of Art. I, § 8 as a general
framework for Federalism rather than as independent, limited realms of Congressional
lawmaking authority).
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A. REFINEMENT OF THIS PAPER'S LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
INTERPRETATION
The limited Economic Activity interpretation determines whether a
regulation has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. First, a law that
directly affects some exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all
engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. Second, a law that
has the purpose of regulating some exchange, transaction, or contract of
value to all engaged parties is a regulation of an economic activity. In
determining whether a law has the purpose of regulating valuable
transactions, courts should review whether a jurisdictional element is
employed as well as the intent of legislature for the law. A law that
satisfies either the direct regulation or the purpose category substantially
affects interstate commerce, thereby satisfying Lopez and Morrison.
The two Morrison factors, existence of a jurisdictional element and the
legislative intent, are critical for determining whether an indirect regulation
has the purpose of directly affecting economic activity. Morrison's second
factor is whether Congress has used a jurisdictional element in phrasing the
law, which supports the "purpose" requirement in the following way. The
jurisdictional element is typically phrased as a variant of the following:
"the purchase or sale must be through interstate commerce." By imposing
an "interstate commerce" requirement, Congress is limiting the law to
activity that in some way involves commercial transactions. As such, the
Congressional purpose more likely involves a specific commercial
transaction to which the law is limited. The third Morrison factor is the
legislative intent and history of the regulation. Of course, Congressional
committees can "lie" in the drafting process and evince a purpose that
satisfies this factor. However, the Supreme Court has reserved final
judgment on whether a regulation is "economic" rather than deferring
entirely to Congress. 35 Separately, though somewhat related, Congress can
only believably lie to an extent. For instance, when enacting the VAWA,
Congress could have demonstrated a need to halt violence against women
for the purpose of preserving certain valuable transactions.1 36 However, no
reasonable court reviewing the constitutionality of the VAWA would have
believed a statement that a statute passed for the general protection of
women was enacted for the principal purpose of regulating valuable
transactions.
' See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
136 Ironically, Congress relied upon the findings of commercial effects as a justification
for enacting the VAWA, which had the purpose of enhancing the general safety of women.
See id. at 615. The VAWA neither directly regulates valuable transactions nor has the
purpose of doing so.
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The efficacy of these two factors in revealing the underlying purpose
of a regulation is limited, and the two are more effective at exposing a law's
shortcomings rather than its merits. However, the combined efficacy of
these factors need not be a panacea for determining a law's purpose. They
only must provide guidance and clarity to courts determining whether a law
has the purpose of regulating valuable transactions.
This paper's interpretation has two limiting effects on Morrison. First,
a court determining that the regulation at issue has a direct effect on a
valuable transaction need not review the other Morrison factors. Second,
the Attenuation Factor limits indirect regulation to only those laws that have
the purpose of regulating valuable transactions. Congress may choose to
regulate a noneconomic activity when the purpose of the law is to regulate
valuable transactions-transactions best affected with direct regulation of
some noneconomic activity.137 Indirect regulation with purposes other than
to affect valuable transactions do not satisfy the Lopez Substantial Effects
Category; this is the significant limitation imposed by this interpretation.
B. JUSTIFYING THE LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY INTERPRETATION
1. Broad Versus Limited Attenuation
Why should the Attenuation Factor of Morrison be interpreted
narrowly to impose a purpose requirement on an indirect regulation, rather
than allow for some indirect regulation that does not have the purpose of
operating on an economic activity? Attenuation, according to the Supreme
Cort majority, was significant in the Court's determination that the VAWA
was unconstitutional."' This fourth factor eliminates Congress's ability to
simply state in legislative findings that a particular law affects some
economic activity.' 39 The Court could have limited the Lopez Substantial
137 Consider the following example of when Congress may pass a law with the purpose
of regulating valuable transactions. Suppose that Congress wants to limit loans sharks from
entering contractual agreements. Through detailed study, Congressional committees have
discovered that the majority of these contracts are entered by attendees of high school
football games who do not have children participating in the games. Congress also has
discovered that the overwhelming majority of those patrons to high school football games
that do not have children participating in the contests are in the audience specifically to
conduct this business. Could Congress pass a law prohibiting spectators to high school
football games who do not have children participating in the contests, assuming that entry to
the football game was costless? Under the "purpose" prong, this would be a direct
regulation of a noneconomic activity with the purpose of indirectly regulating valuable
transactions between debtors and loan sharks.
138 See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 615.
139 Id. at 614-15 (stating that Congress's assertion that the VAWA had a substantial
effect on economic activity "would allow Congress to regulate any crime as long as the
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Effects Category to those laws having a direct effect on economic activity.
In the Court's view, however, some laws that only have an indirect effect
on economic activity are still constitutional; the Attenuation Factor defines
that boundary. 1
40
On the one hand, a broad interpretation of attenuation may be
construed, permitting courts to judge in an ad hoc manner laws with neither
a direct effect on economic activity nor the purpose of directly affecting
economic activity. 41 In his well-known article, The Rule of Law as a Law
of Rules, Justice Scalia lists five values for the rule of law: (1) maintaining
"the appearance of equal treatment" with respect to litigants similarly
situated; (2) strengthening the ability of the Supreme Court to maintain
uniformity; (3) enhancing predictability; (4) diminishing judicial discretion;
and (5) strengthening the ability of judges to enforce the law in the face of
popular opposition. 42  A broad attenuation interpretation is inferior at
satisfying these goals when compared to a limited interpretation, such as the
one proposed here. For instance, under a broad interpretation of
attenuation, a court could simultaneously find a law prohibiting the
possession of machineguns constitutional but one prohibiting the possession
of knives unconstitutional.1 43 In this scenario, the machinegun possessor
would at least appear to be disadvantaged 44 by possessing an illegal
weapon designed to shoot rather than one designed to stab. Moreover,
uniformity across the circuit courts could not be maintained under a broad
interpretation, 145 predictability would be hopeless, 146 and judicial discretion
would increase rather than diminish. 47 (Would the owner of an illegal rifle
with a bayonet attached have a low or high probability of winning her
Commerce Clause challenge?)
A broad interpretation of attenuation also inhibits Justice Scalia's fifth
factor. In jurisdictions with a broad interpretation of attenuation, judges
nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment,
production, transit, or consumption," if relied upon completely).
"0 See id. at 612.
141 Given that the Chief Justice, joined by Justice Scalia, comprised the majority opinions
in Lopez and Morrison, a broad, ad hoc analysis was not likely intended.
142 Scalia, supra note 118, at 1178-80.
143 This could happen if, using the Ninth Circuit's "effects on market demand" approach,
each additional machinegun affected the demand in the national machinegun market but each
additional knife, like McCoy's child pornography, did not affect the overall market demand,
even in the aggregate.
144 This is Justice Scalia's first factor. See Scalia, supra note 118, at 1178.
145 This is Justice Scalia's second factor. See id. at 1179.
146 This is Justice Scalia's third factor. See id.
147 This is Justice Scalia's fourth factor. See id. at 1179-80.
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have both more authority and more responsibility to review case-by-case.
But this responsibility weakens the ability of judges to enforce unpopular
laws, and alternatively, weakens the ability of judges to reject popular laws.
A judge reviewing a case in which a defendant is liable per a popular but
unconstitutional law, which indirectly affects valuable transactions with no
purpose of doing so and which is in a jurisdiction where only a limited
attenuation interpretation exists, has the power-more appropriately, has
the obligation-to find the law unconstitutional. But if the same defendant
is tried in a jurisdiction where a broad interpretation carries the day, the
judge is exposed to political pressure to find the law to be not too
attenuated. A broad interpretation of attenuation weakens this judge's
power to make unpopular decisions.
In contrast, a limited interpretation of attenuation reduces, and may
even eliminate, these concerns. A limited interpretation adds consistency
among similarly situated litigants, adds uniformity and predictability to
constitutionality reviews, decreases judicial discretion and correspondingly
enhances judicial ability to make unpopular decisions. Furthermore, a
limited interpretation of attenuation clarifies the requirements for Congress
when making new law, assuming that Congress never wants a statute to be
deemed unconstitutional by the courts. Under the limited Economic
Activity interpretation proposed here, the Attenuation Factor of Morrison
limits laws with only indirect effects on economic activity to those with the
purpose of directly affecting economic activity. This interpretation allows
Congress to indirectly regulate economic activity, but only in a principled
and structured manner.
2. Circumventing the As-Applied Doctrine Under the Limited Economic
Activity Interpretation
As-applied challenges 48 were used by the Sixth Circuit in Corp, 49 by
the Ninth Circuit in both McCoy and Stewart,'50 and by the Kallestad
dissent.15' Conversely, the Fifth Circuit's Kallestad majority rejected an as-
applied challenge regarding the defendant's intrastate possession of
homemade child pornography,' 52 the Second Circuit reaffirmed its blanket
148 For a discussion of the As-Applied Doctrine, see supra note 86.
149 United States v. Corp, 236 F.3d 325, 332 (6th Cir. 2001).
150 United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140 (9th Cir. 2003); United States v.
McCoy, 323 F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
151 United States v. Kallestad, 236 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 2000) (Jolly, J., dissenting).
152 Id.
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rejection of the As-Applied Doctrine in Holston,' and the McCoy dissent
rejected use of the As-Applied Doctrine specifically in Commerce Clause
adjudication. 154 A doctrine that eliminates the courts' ability to analyze
statutes on an as-applied basis, at least within the confines of Commerce
Clause jurisprudence, has merit. When a court decides that a law is
unconstitutional as applied to a party, the bulk of the law still remains. As-
applied challenges carve pockets of activity out of the original law passed
by Congress. What remains is a decrepit form of the original regulation-
weakened, but not entirely vanquished.
Two significant problems exist with as-applied constitutionality, at
least with respect to Commerce Clause challenges. First, although both
Lopez and Morrison were written broadly and leave much room for
interpretation, the tests created in the two cases left no possibility for as-
applied reviews. 55  Lopez asks courts to judge whether the law being
attacked can be categorized in one of the case's three classes. Morrison
asks courts to review four factors related to structure and function in order
to determine whether the law has a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. Neither case asks whether the criminal defendant's activity was
itself either economic or one with a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. That Alfonzo Lopez brought his gun to school for the purpose
of making a sale was irrelevant to the Lopez Court, precisely because the
test for whether a law is constitutional under the Commerce Clause is not
53 United States v. Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 90-91 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that incidental
intrastate activity within a class of interstate regulation is subject to the same regulation as
the interstate regulation).
154 McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1137 (Trott, J., dissenting) ("[T]he resolution of this case boils
down to whether the statute under review,... which encompasses a certain kind of intrastate
possession, passes Commerce Clause muster, not whether McCoy's categorically peculiar
circumstances have a pellucid nexus to interstate commerce.").
' 55 See Sabri v. United States, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 1949 (2004) (Kennedy & Scalia, J.J.,
concurring in part). For a summary of the relevant issues addressed in Sabri, see supra note
63. In his concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy responded to the majority's "afterword on
Sabri's technique for challenging his indictment by facial attacks on the underlying statute."
Id. at 1948 ("[F]acial challenges are best when infrequent."). Justice Kennedy commented
that, although the majority noted a general aversion to facial challenges, this aversion does
not question the practice followed in Lopez and Morrison. Id. at 1949 (Kennedy & Scalia,
J.J., concurring in part). In Lopez and Morrison, "the Court did resolve the basic question
whether Congress, in enacting the statutes challenged there, had exceeded its legislative
power under the Constitution." Id. (Kennedy & Scalia, J.J., concurring in part). In other
words, at least Justices Kennedy and Scalia view Lopez and Morrison as only creating the
ability for facial challenges, thereby precluding parties from raising as-applied Commerce
Clause challenges.
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dependant on the actual activity of the defendant. 156 As-applied challenges,
however, almost by definition review not the underlying law or regulation
but rather the activity of the individual defendant. Since Lopez and
Morrison are concerned solely with the law and not with each particular
defendant's conduct, as-applied challenges have no place in this rubric.
Blind abdication to the Lopez and Morrison structure is a necessary
basis on which this paper is founded, at least where an unambiguous
direction was taken by the Court, such as with the application of as-applied
challenges. The lower courts have consistently returned to the tests of these
two cases for a skeletal framework, if not substantive guidance, when
adjudicating Commerce Clause challenges. However, an alternative
justification exists for excluding as-applied challenges from Commerce
Clause doctrine. As stated above, the primary pursuit of judges should be
to apply the rule of law.
Justice Scalia is asked to perform double-duty here, since the
reasoning for rejecting the As-Applied Doctrine in Commerce Clause
challenges parallels that for preferring a limited interpretation of attenuation
to a broad interpretation. 157  Admittedly, within any given circuit, a
subsequent defendant identically situated to a prior defendant who won an
as-applied challenge will not be liable under the same law. The activity of
the subsequent defendant, identical to the prior defendant, falls within the
cove of activity isolated from the remaining law after the as-applied
challenge. However, a third defendant, who is only similarly situated to the
two prior defendants, may still be exposed to the original law's remnants.
For instance, if Charles Kallestad is charged today in the Ninth Circuit for
new activity identical to his conduct in Texas,' he would not be protected
by the Ninth Circuit's McCoy decision, which only carved possession of a
single item of homemade child pornography out of 18 U.S.C. §
2252(a)(4)(B). The first four of Justice Scalia's rule of law values are
implicated here. The similarly situated defendant, like Kallestad in the
Ninth Circuit, has neither a certainty nor even a significantly high
probability of equal treatment. Predictability is affected short of the
Kallestad defendant being guaranteed equal treatment to that of McCoy,
and the current circuit splits demonstrate uniformity shortcomings.
Furthermore, judicial discretion increases with as-applied challenges, since
156 Contra Ides, supra note 20, at 569 (arguing that, if economic activity is to be the new
proxy for commerce, the Court conveniently ignored that Lopez intended to engage in an
economic transaction).
157 See Scalia, supra note 118, at 1178-80; see also supra notes 143-47 and
accompanying text.
'58 For an explanation of Kallestad's conduct, see supra Section II.B. 1.
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judges have the authority both to determine whether to apply an as-applied
challenge or facial challenge as well as to determine the extent to which the
as-applied challenge will diminish the scope of the law at issue .
59
As-applied challenges negatively affect Justice Scalia's fifth value as
well. Jurisdictions where as-applied challenges are permitted force judges
to determine on a case-by-case basis whether a particular as-applied
challenge is appropriate and to decide the extent to which the law affected
is to be reduced in efficacy.' 60 In these jurisdictions, judges have both more
authority and more responsibility due to the permissibility of as-applied
challenges. But this responsibility both weakens the ability of judges to
enforce unpopular laws and weakens the ability of judges to reject popular
laws. A judge reviewing a case in which a defendant is liable per a popular
but unconstitutional law, in a jurisdiction where only facial challenges are
permitted, has the obligation to find the entire law facially unconstitutional.
But if the same defendant is tried in a jurisdiction permitting both facial and
as-applied challenges, although this defendant should be found not guilty,
the judge is exposed to political pressure to find the law unconstitutional
only as applied and leave in tact the rest of the unconstitutional law.
Excluding as-applied challenges, at least for Commerce Clause challenges,
strengthens the power of courts to make unpopular decisions.1
61
Unfortunately, the current standards by which several lower courts have
applied Lopez and Morrison inappropriately permit their use.
The limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here is one
such analysis that, without needing the Supreme Court to universally reject
the As-Applied Doctrine, eliminates the ability for defendants to capitalize
on these challenges.' 62 According to Professor Richard Fallon, as-applied
159 For example, the McCoy Court found 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) unconstitutional as
applied to both McCoy and other similarly situated defendants. McCoy, 323 F.3d at 1131.
'60 See id.
161 In a similar sense, prohibiting as-applied challenges "shuts off the courts as an avenue
for social change." Cf Thomas Merrill, Bork v. Burke, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 509,
509, 522 (1996) (referencing Professor Robert Bork and British politician Edmund Burke).
Although Professor Merrill's paper advances "conventionalism" as a conservative alternative
to originalism, prohibiting as-applied constitutional challenges has parallel conservative
results. His conventionalism justifications bear equally on justifications for excluding as-
applied challenges:
We tend to think of activist judges as the great antithesis of democratic governance, and a
judiciary [void of as-applied Commerce Clause challenges] would be a very inhospitable place
for judicial activism. Just think of what stodgy and boring places courts would become [absent
these challenges], what with judges thumbing through precedents of lower courts and surveying
state statutes and other uninspiring sources!
Id. at 522.
162 See sources cited supra note 86.
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challenges are the consequence of particular doctrinal structures applied by
the courts. 163 A change in the applied law, such as adoption of the limited
Economic Activity interpretation, may shift constitutional review from an
ad hoc as-applied analysis to an analysis that facially reviews the
constitutionality of a law. 64 The limited Economic Activity interpretation
involves a series of iterated questions.1 6' Does the law directly affect an
exchange, transaction, or contract of value to all parties? If not, does the
law have the purpose of affecting such a valuable transaction? Does the
structure of the statute employ a jurisdiction element, or does the legislative
history lend support to the regulation's asserted purpose? These questions
directly address the regulation and do not inquire into the defendant's
conduct with respect to the regulation. 66 Under this interpretation of the
Economic Activity Test, defendants have no space within which to assert a
defense that the law is unconstitutional as applied to their conduct, leaving
only "valid rule" facial challenge in a criminal defense lawyer's arsenal.
67
This is not to say that defendants are without recourse. A defendant
always has an option to assert a statutory interpretation defense that the law
in question does not apply to the conduct for which he or she is charged. In
one sense, this may sound remarkably similar to an explanation of the As-
Applied Doctrine and may seem to be nothing more than a semantics
argument. However, significant differences exists between the two
approaches. With an as-applied challenge, the defense asserts that a
particular law has been unconstitutionally applied to his or her case.
163 See Fallon, supra note 86, at 1321. Prof. Fallon argues that, conceptually, facial
challenges and partial facial challenges are nothing more than special cases of as-applied
challenges. Compare id. at 1324, with Henning, supra note 86, at 433 (arguing that a "valid
rule" challenge, which attacks the constitutionality of a law on grounds that Congress does
not have the authority to make the law, is a facial challenge independent of the facts
surrounding the defendant's case).
'64 See Henning, supra note 86, at 436 ("With no Supreme Court analysis about how
federalism should be applied, lower courts have asserted their authority to enforce the
permissible line on a case-by-case basis, engaging in a type of ad hoc review of individual
prosecutions to ensure that the proceeding involves a matter that is truly national.") (internal
quotations omitted).
165 See supra Section I1I.A.
166 The interpretation falls under Professors Monaghan's and Henning's "valid rule"
category of facial challenges, since the challenge asks whether Congress had Commerce
Clause authority under Lopez and Morrison to make the law in question. See Henning,
supra note 86, at 432-33 (citing Monaghan, supra note 86, at 3); cf United States v. McCoy,
323 F.3d 1114, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003) (Trott, J., dissenting) ("[T]he de minimis nexus of
Rhonda McCoy's personal activity to interstate commerce is of 'no consequence,' so long as
(I) her conduct falls within the purview of the statute, as she has stipulated, and (2) the
statute itself which covers that activity is valid.").
167 See Henning, supra note 86, at 432-33.
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Congress may draft laws very broadly with the intention of having the
courts chip away at the scope through As-Applied challenges. For instance,
if Congress were to pass a law federalizing all homicide,168 the law would
be enforced until found unconstitutional by the courts. But after the first as-
applied challenge was raised and sustained, the entire law would still have
force, except for the space where the law was found not to apply to the
particular defendant's actions.
Conversely, with a "valid rule" facial challenge, such as the only
available Commerce Clause challenge remaining under the limited
Economic Activity interpretation, the defendant may raise two defenses.
The defendant may argue that the law exceeds the Congressional authority
granted in the Constitution. Alternatively, the defendant may argue that the
his or her conduct is beyond the scope of the law, which is not a
constitutional challenge at all. In this scenario, Congress cannot draft law
very broadly, because the first constitutional attack raised would be a facial
challenge with the potential to reject the entire law. Even if a law is found
facially constitutional, the scope of the law may still be too narrow to
capture the defendant's conduct. If Congress passed a law federalizing all
homicide, the first case challenging the new law would result in the entire
law being held unconstitutional as exceeding Commerce Clause authority.
If, instead, Congress passed a law federally criminalizing all transactions in
which an assassin is hired to perform a homicide, then the law would likely
survive a facial Commerce Clause challenge.169  However, a criminal
defendant would have the ability to show that his or her conduct was not of
the type regulated by the law. T°
The facial challenge that results from the limited Economic Activity
interpretation is consistent with the Supreme Court's requirement for
Commerce Clause constitutionality review through a "case-by-case
inquiry. '  Rather than review the constitutionality of a law as applied to
68 Thankfully, Congress has not yet attempted to acquire a police power so rooted in the
traditional functions and responsibilities of the States.
"69 This example is not meant to imply that Congress would ever realistically have a
reason to pass such a law. Rather, the example is only meant to show how the limited
Economic Activity interpretation operates. Note that Congress would have the power to
make this law under both the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed by this
paper as well as any of the broader interpretations of Morrison currently applied by the
lower courts.
170 Perhaps the particular criminal defendant murdered his business partner regarding a
disputed debt owed by their business.
'71 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995). Scholars have interpreted
Lopez as providing structured tests for Commerce Clause constitutionality, notwithstanding
the Court's mandate for a "case-by-case inquiry." See, e.g., Fried, supra note 4, at 39
(predating Morrison).
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the defendant's conduct, the review merely asks whether the law is
sufficiently broad to criminalize the defendant's actual conduct. This
approach removes the burden from the courts in addressing constitutionality
of every Commerce Clause law as applied to every defendant, instead
placing the burden on Congress. Congress must perform an optimization,
on the one hand broadening a law to capture the most possible conduct,
countered on the other hand by a threat of having the entire law, if
unconstitutionally broad, declared wholly unconstitutional.
3. Summary of the Limited Economic Activity Interpretation's Benefits
A summary of the benefits derived under the limited Economic
Activity interpretation is in order. First, the interpretation is among the
many interpretations consistent with Lopez and Morrison, a necessary
condition if this paper is to have any real persuasive force among the lower
courts. Second, the interpretation limits the Morrison factors, particularly
the Attenuation Factor, in a structured and principled manner. In doing so,
the interpretation raises creation of and abidance by a rule of law above
other judicial goals. The interpretation is also superior to a broad
interpretation of Morrison at satisfying Justice Scalia's five factors for
assessing various rules of law. Finally, the interpretation eliminates the
ability of defendants to raise as-applied constitutional challenges, thereby
limiting defendants' defenses to facial challenges coupled with statutory
interpretation arguments. As with a narrow interpretation of attenuation, a
doctrine, such as the one proposed here, that eliminates as-applied
challenges better satisfies Justice Scalia's factors than a doctrine that does
not.
C. VALIDATION THROUGH PAST SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
The Court, in both Lopez and Morrison, reaffirmed the post-New Deal
Commerce Clause cases, stating that an outer bound had always existed
despite ever-increasing expanses of authority under the Clause. 72  This
paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation must consistently yield the
outcomes reached by the Court over the past sixty years. In order to have
any persuasive power among the lower courts, this paper, founded on the
premise that the lower courts will abide by Lopez and Morrison, must defer
to those cases, which did not overturn a single New Deal or post-New Deal
172 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-57 (noting that "outer limits" have always existed on
Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause); Morrison, 598 U.S. at 608
(confirming the principles stated in Lopez).
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Commerce Clause decision. Wickard v. Filburn,17 3 "perhaps the most far
reaching example of Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity,' 74
will be analyzed first, followed by Perez v. United States, addressing
federal loan sharking statutes.1 75 The former concluded the transformation
of the Commerce Clause from an enumerated power to regulate
"commerce" into a virtual plenary power to regulate "economics.' 76 The
latter is a Commerce Clause criminal action, validating this paper's
interpretation in a criminal suit.
177
Wickard addressed the constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment
Act, which placed limits on the amount of wheat a farm could produce in a
given season. 178 Specifically, the Act controlled the volume of wheat traded
in interstate commerce as a means of regulating price through regulating
supply. 179 Again, the approach employed under the limited Economic
Activity interpretation is first to determine whether the regulation directly
affects a valuable transaction. The Act here directly regulates the
production of wheat, which, as in Filburn's case, is not always traded in
interstate commerce. Regulation of production with no requirement for a
subsequent trade does not directly affect a valuable transaction. The second
step is now invoked, and a review of the regulation's purpose is undertaken.
Under the "purpose" prong of the limited Economic Activity interpretation,
the purpose of the regulation must be to affect a valuable transaction. The
Act's purpose was to indirectly control market prices for wheat, affecting
wheat prices and minimizing the amplitude of price shifts resulting from
varying supplies. In other words, the Act affects the price the seller of
wheat receives in wheat market transactions. The buyer is receiving the
valuable wheat in exchange for the indirectly regulated amount of cash.
Thus, the Agricultural Adjustment Act is a regulation that has the purpose
of affecting a valuable transaction. Under the limited Economic Activity
1' 317 U.S. 11I (1942), cited with approval in Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
174 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560.
171 See402 U.S. 146 (1971).
176 See Nelson & Pushaw, supra note 3, at 82 ("Wickard enabled Congress to regulate
whatever it pleased .... "); McGinnis, supra note 3, at 511 (stating the same).
177 Two additional cases will be validated in the notes: United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 115 (1941), in which the Court first articulated the "plenary power" granted by the
Commerce Clause; and Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985), a review that preceded
Lopez of an arson statute and corresponding and use of explosives to cause fires.
'18 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 113-14.
179 Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 § 331, 7 U.S.C. § 1331 (2003); see Wickard,
317 U.S. at 115.
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interpretation, the Agricultural Adjustment Act is constitutional, consistent
with the outcome in the Wickard Court.'80
Perez marks the criminal law review undertaken for validation
purposes. The question addressed in that case was whether the Consumer
Credit Protection Act is constitutional under Commerce Clause authority.'8s
The law prohibits extortionate credit transactions, which are transactions in
which the debtor understands that failure to repay per the creditor's terms
may result in "harm to the person, reputation, or property" of the debtor.
8 2
Congress produced findings that extortionate credit transactions, made
through "loan sharks," are a significant means by which crime
organizations are funded.8 3 In other words, the purposes of the regulation
are to protect consumers of credit and to diminish a stream of revenue for
organized crime. Under the limited Economic Activity interpretation
proposed by this paper, the first step is to determine whether the regulation
directly affects a valuable transaction. Notwithstanding the Act's purpose
of curtailing organized crime, the Consumer Credit Protection Act directly
regulates extortionate credit transactions. First, the agreements being
regulated are in fact transactions. Second, these transactions are valuable to
both parties. The debtor, who is often unable to acquire credit from more
reputable establishments, receives needed cash. The loan shark receives the
future stream of extortionate cash flows, with low risk of default by the
so Similarly in Darby, a Georgia lumber manufacturer violated the Fair Labor Standards
Act, and the Court held that the law had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. See 312
U.S. at 11I, 118-19. The law, although designed to protect workers, regulates the purchase
of labor by employers. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §§ 6-7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-202
(2003); see Darby, 312 U.S. at 109. The limited Economic Activity interpretation first
requires answering whether the regulation directly affects a valuable transaction. The Act
imposes minimum wage and maximum hour limits on labor. Employment is the trade of
personal services in exchange for money. In the Act, Congress regulated the minimum price
employers could pay for these services and the maximum number of hours that could be paid
at the minimum price. Darby, 312 U.S. at 110 (quoting Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 §§
6-7, 29 U.S.C. §§ 206-07). This is a regulation directly affecting a valuable transaction,
since the employees receive wages in exchange for the services received by the employers.
The Act also prevents shipment in interstate commerce of goods created by labor not
conforming to the prescribed minimum wage and maximum hour requirements. Prevention
of shipments for particular reasons imposes regulation directly on a transaction. The
transaction is valuable to both the employer, seeking pecuniary gains from the trade of the
produced goods, and the purchaser, seeking some benefit from ownership of the goods.
Thus, this part of the Act also satisfies the requirements imposed by the "direct affect" prong
of the limited Economic Activity interpretation. The regulation directly affects a valuable
transaction and is thus a regulation of an economic activity.
SI See Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 146-47 (1971).
182 See Title 11 of the Consumer Credit Protection Act, 18 U.S.C §§ 891-896 (2003);
Perez, 402 U.S. at 148.
183 Perez, 402 U.S. at 149.
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debtor due to the threat of violence. Thus, the Consumer Credit Protection
Act is a regulation that directly affects a valuable transaction. The limited
Economic Activity interpretation finds the Act constitutional, which is
consistent with the Perez Court.
84
IV. PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF THE LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
INTERPRETATION
With an understanding of the mechanics of the limited Economic
Activity interpretation as well as some confidence in the interpretation's
appropriateness through Supreme Court validation, the current circuit court
conflicts may now be analyzed. This section reviews the circuit court splits
in light of the limited Economic Activity interpretation. Additionally, the
interpretation's effects are assessed beyond the realm of the criminal law
setting in environmental regulation.
A. ADDRESSING THE SPLIT CIRCUITS
1. Possession of Child Pornography, 18 U.S. C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)
Recall that the courts in Rodia, Kallestad, Corp, McCoy, and Holston
all addressed the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), which
prohibits manufacture and possession of child pornography made with
184 In 1985, the Court addressed whether a federal arson act was constitutional. See
Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 858 (1985). The statute, part of Title Xl of the
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, criminalizes the attempt to damage or destroy any
building used in interstate commerce or "in any activity affecting interstate" commerce.
Title XI of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (2003). Under the
"direct affects" prong of the limited Economic Activity interpretation, the regulation must
directly affect a valuable transaction. Here, the regulation directly prohibits arson. Moving
to the "purpose" prong of the interpretation, the regulation must have the purpose of
affecting a valuable transaction. Employing the second and third Morrison factors, a
jurisdictional element and legislative intent, illuminates this inquiry. The statute is limited to
the arson of structures affecting interstate commerce, which supports a decision that the
statute has the purpose of affecting a valuable transaction. The legislative intent states that
"[t]he section originated because of the need 'to curb the use, transportation, and possession
of explosives."' Russell, 471 U.S. at 862 (quoting Explosives Control: Hearing on H.R.
17154, H.R. 16699, H.R. 18573 and Related Proposals before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 (1970)). Stated another way, the purpose of
the regulation is to indirectly restrict the interstate trade of explosives. The interstate trade of
explosives involves valuable transactions. As such, the regulation has the purpose of
affecting a valuable transaction. The Court went further to inquire as to whether the statute
applies to attempted arson of a two-unit apartment used as a rental property. See id. at 859.
By statutory interpretation, "[t]he rental of real estate is unquestionably" commercial
activity, meaning that the statute applies to the defendant. Id. at 862.
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materials that have traveled through interstate commerce.'85 The First,
Second, Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all found the statute
constitutional and the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have found the statute
unconstitutional as applied to particular defendants.
The first step under the limited Economic Activity interpretation is to
address whether the statute directly affects a valuable transaction. 86
Section 2252(a)(4)(B) only regulates possession, which unlike transactions,
only involves one person. Admittedly, trades occur between manufacturers
of the materials needed to make child pornography, but the law criminalizes
possession of child pornography, not the trade of materials that may
possibly be used by someone producing child pornography. As such, the
regulation does not involve a transaction. 187
Focus turns to the second step, which calls for a review of whether the
purpose of the regulation is to affect a valuable transaction. Use of a
jurisdictional element and legislative history aid in this inquiry. The statute
does employ a jurisdictional element, 88 but the element does not modify
possession of child pornography. Rather, the jurisdictional element
modifies the shipment of materials prior to their use in making child
pornography. The element used here does not support a finding that the
purpose of the statute is to regulate a valuable transaction. More
significantly, the legislative history states that the purpose of the statute is
to enhance federal efforts to "combat child pornography."' 89  Effects of
child pornography, like effects of gender abuse seen in Morrison, have an
effect on the national economy. In terms of the limited Economic Activity
185 The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) has also been addressed by the
First Circuit in United States v. Robinson, 137 F.3d 652 (lst Cir. 1998) and the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. Angle. 234 F.3d 326 (7th Cir. 2000).
186 The statute prohibits the possession of child pornography that was produced using
material that had traveled through interstate commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (2003).
Note that § 2252(a)(4)(B) also criminalizes possession of child pornography when the
finished product has been shipped through interstate commerce. That part of the statute has
not been attacked on Commerce Clause grounds and is constitutional under the "purpose"
category of the limited Economic Activity interpretation.
187 The value element (i.e., "valuable transaction") is satisfied by possession, since,
economically speaking, people only possess things of value. However, "value" in the
limited Economic Activity interpretation modifies "transaction" and is alone insufficient.
188 The statute criminalizes possession of child pornography "produced using materials
which have been mailed or so shipped or transported, by any means including by computer."
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B).
189 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; S. REP. No. 95-438, at 8 (1977), reprinted
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 40, 47 (advocating legislative changes and enforcement procedures in
order to enhance combative efforts). Congress was concerned that "because of the vast
potential profits in child pornography, these sordid enterprises are growing at a very rapid
rate." Id. at 7.
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interpretation, the Congressional findings show that the purpose of the
statute is protection of children from being abused and exploited.' 90
Although certainly problematic, the exploitation of children for the
production of pornography is not a valuable transaction affected by the
statute. As such, under the limited Economic Activity interpretation
proposed by this paper, criminalizing mere possession of child pornography
produced with material that has traveled through interstate commerce per 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) is not an economic activity and is consequently
unconstitutional.191
2. The Freedom ofAccess to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248
The next statute to address is the FACE Act, which criminalizes
attempts to prevent access to abortion clinic entrances. 92 Recall that the
Fifth Circuit's 1997 Bird I decision found the Act constitutional, relying on
the approach to Commerce Clause attacks outlined in Lopez.' 93 In 2003, the
Southern District of Texas rejected the holding in Bird I and found the
FACE Act unconstitutional, 94 even though that court is bound by Fifth
Circuit precedent and even though the Fifth Circuit had since applied the
Morrison Economic Activity Test in Kallestad.'9
The first category of the limited Economic Activity interpretation
proposed here can be easily applied to § 248. The statute criminalizes
attempts to prevent access to abortion clinic entrances. Obstruction of a
building's entrance is not a valuable transaction. 196 The party attempting to
'90 See id. at 8.
191 The outcome presented here is in direct conflict with the First, Second, Third, Fifth,
and Seventh Circuits. Furthermore, the outcome here finds the portion of § 2252(a)(4)(B)
criminalizing possession with interstate travel of used materials facially unconstitutional and
not merely unconstitutional as applied to the particular defendants. This is a broader
outcome than the as-applied unconstitutional holdings of the Sixth Circuit in United States v.
Corp, 236 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001), and the Ninth Circuit in United States v. McCoy, 323
F.3d 1114, 1133 (9th Cir. 2003).
192 See Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994)
[hereinafter FACE]; supra notes 91-92.
193 See United States v. Bird (Bird 1), No. 95-20792, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33988 (5th
Cir. Sept. 24, 1997).
194 See United States v. Bird (Bird 11), 279 F. Supp. 2d 827, 836 (S.D. Tex. 2003)
(holding § 248 of FACE unconstitutional); see also supra note 104 and accompanying text.
195 The District Court for the Southern District of Texas applied the Morrison factors and
distinguished the Fifth Circuit's Kallestad decision. See id. at 836 ("It is apparent, from a
reading of [§ 248], that it criminalizes noneconomic, intrastate activities.").
196 Like with § 2252(a)(4)(B) above, an argument can be made that the obstruction of
abortion clinic entrances is valuable to the actor. The actor wants to prevent abortions
through his or her actions, which presumably enhances his or her happiness. However, like
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enter the building does not contract with the person obstructing the entrance
for the privilege of being obstructed. Without an exchange or contract, the
"direct affect" category fails, and a review of the statute's purpose is
required.
To be constitutional, the purpose of the regulation must be to affect a
valuable transaction, and in addressing purpose, the existence of a
jurisdictional element and legislative findings are probative but not
dispositive.197  Section 248 of the FACE Act includes no jurisdictional
element. Moreover, "[t]he Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act is
designed to protect health care providers and patients from violent attacks,
blockades, threats of force, and related conduct intended to interfere with
the exercise of the constitutional right to terminate pregnancy."' 98 In other
words, the stated purpose of the Act is not the preservation of abortion
transactions but rather the protection of the constitutional right of women to
have access to safe abortions.
Section 248 is an example of when review of the second and third
Morrison factors does not end the inquiry. 99 Unlike the VAWA, in which
Congress could not point to any specific type of valuable transaction
negatively affected by gender abuse, and unlike 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B),
in which child safety was regulated through the criminalization of
homemade child pornography possession, not child pornography
transactions, the purpose of § 248 is protection of valuable abortion
transactions. Admittedly, concerns for the safety of those entering and
exiting abortion clinics parallels those concerns for children abused by the
child pornography industry. But the purpose of § 248 is to protect the
valuable contracts between patients and abortion clinics being transacted by
inhibiting activists from barricading clinic entrances, which must be
accessible for these transactions to occur. In disagreement with the
Southern District of Texas's Bird II holding, analyzing the FACE Act
through the lens of this paper's limited Economic Activity interpretation
results in holding the Act constitutional.
with § 2252(a)(4)(B), no argument can be made that the activity is an exchange, transaction,
or contract.
197 See supra Section III.A.
'9' S. REP. No. 103-117 at I I (1993) ("The express purpose of the violent and threatening
activity . . . is to deny women access to safe and legal abortion services. Anti-abortion
activists have made it plain that this conduct is part of a deliberate campaign to eliminate
access by closing clinics and intimidating doctors.").
'99 See generally McGinnis, supra note 3, at 514 (arguing that Congress does not make
findings in an unbiased way, but rather "tend[s] to find whatever predicates are necessary to
advance its members' prospects of reelection").
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3. Possession of Home-Grown Machineguns, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)
The final statute to review is 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which criminalizes
all unsanctioned transfer and possession of machineguns. 00 The Ninth
Circuit in Stewart held that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to
defendants in mere possession of homemade machineguns. 20 1 As with both
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and the FACE Act, the "possession" category of
§ 922(o) does not directly affect an exchange, transaction, or contract.02
Although machinegun ownership may have value to gun enthusiasts,
various assassins, and citizens particularly concerned about personal safety,
possession does not equal exchange. The regulation is thus only
constitutional if the purpose is to affect a valuable transaction. However,
according to the Ninth Circuit, "there is no evidence that § 922(o) was
enacted to regulate commercial aspects of the machinegun business. 2 3
Moreover, the express purpose of the law is to provide support to local,
state, and federal law enforcement alike in fighting crime and violence.2°
Finally, § 922(o) employs no jurisdictional element whatsoever.
Section 922(o) is distinguishable from the FACE Act, which is
constitutional under the limited Economic Activity interpretation despite
neither a jurisdictional hook nor adequate legislative intent. The FACE Act
prevents activists from blocking anyone from entering abortion clinics,
including patients, doctors, nurses, janitors, mail carriers, etc. But activists
200 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) (1986).
201 See United States v. Stewart, 348 F.3d 1132, 1140 (2003). Before analyzing § 922(o)
under the Morrison structure, the court overturned Ninth Circuit precedent created in United
States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (1996). In that case, the court held § 922(o) constitutional
under the Lopez first category: a channel of commerce. The court reasoned that possession
of machineguns must be preceded by trade of machineguns through interstate commerce.
Stewart "reveals the limits of Rambo's logic," since Stewart fabricated the machineguns
himself See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1135.
202 The "transfer" category of § 922(o) is analyzed differently. For this category, the
regulation may have a direct effect on a valuable transaction. Presumably, a transfer of a
machinegun from a transferor is accompanied by some remuneration paid by the
machinegun recipient to the transferor. Further, the machinegun has value to the recipient
and the cash exchanged for the machinegun has value to the transferor. As such, the transfer
of machinegun regulation in § 922(o) is a regulation of a valuable transaction consistent with
the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here.
203 See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137. Additionally, "nothing in the legislative history of any
of the earlier firearms statutes speaks to the relationship between mere possession of
firearms and interstate commerce." See id. at 1139 (citing S. REP. No. 90-1097 (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2197 (addressing the need to regulate firearms traffic
into the U.S.); H.R. REP. No. 90-1577 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4410, 4411
(finding a need to control interstate and foreign firearms commerce in order to assist the
states)).
204 Gun Control Act of 1968 § 101, Pub. L. No. 90-618, 82 Stat. 1213 (1968).
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who block entrances are only concerned with preventing the transaction of
abortion services. Section 922(o) may have been designed to regulate
possession for the purpose of affecting machinegun transactions. However,
where abortion activists have a unitary purpose in barricading abortion
clinic entrances, possession of a machinegun is not necessarily for the
purpose of making a sale.20 5 Machinegun possession-particularly coupled
with possession of machinegun bullets-provides the owner with much
more than the ability to participate in a sale, whereas barricading an
abortion clinic entrance serves no purpose other than preventing parties
from entering valuable abortion transactions. Under the limited Economic
Activity interpretation proposed here, § 922(o) is unconstitutional.0 6
B. CIVIL LAW UNDER THE LIMITED ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
INTERPRETATION
This paper has focused on the effects of Lopez and Morrison on
criminal law created per Congress's Commerce Clause authority. However,
the cases and the limited Economic Activity interpretation proposed here
have implications well beyond the bounds of criminal law. The loudest
critics of a limited interpretation of Morrison's Attenuation Factor may be
environmentalists concerned that environmental regulation, also created per
Congressional Commerce Clause power, will be diminished or eliminated.
Their concerns are understandable, considering that much, if not all,
existing environmental regulation enhances the public welfare.
Furthermore, the States are each at a strategic disadvantage compared to the
federal government when regulating the consumption of environmental
resources, since each state would prefer less environmental regulation to
more, thereby causing an environmental "race to the bottom.
20 7
Environmentalists should not construe the limited Economic Activity
interpretation as signaling the demise of federal environmental regulation
and the consequential approach of an environmental Armageddon. Since
the New Deal, the Supreme Court has recognized the need for an expanded
interpretation of "commerce" to operate in the modem industrial world.08
Environmental regulation has a place in this expanded view, even under the
restrictive Attenuation Factor interpretation presented here. The restrictive
205 See Stewart, 348 F.3d at 1137.
206 The Ninth Circuit only found § 922(o) unconstitutional as applied to Stewart. See id.
at 1140.
207 Cf. Regan, supra note 20, at 609 (arguing that states experience some Prisoners'
Dilemma effects when choosing an optimal amount of environmental regulation).
208 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 556-57 (1995) (citing Nat'l Labor Relations
Bd. v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
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interpretation of the Attenuation Factor only operates on the Substantial
Effects Category of Lopez and not on either the Channels of Commerce
Category or the Instrumentalities of Commerce Category. Under this
construct, all regulation of pollution in the air and waterways will not be
affected by the approach of this paper, since all pollution regulation is
regulation of the channels of commerce. Even pollution of underground
water tables is protected, since this water eventually reaches surface
waterways. Environmentalists should take comfort in the fact that, even if
the Court one day adopts Justice Thomas's Originalist's interpretation of
"commerce" and the Commerce Clause, regulation of channels, upheld
since the Marshall Court, will still be preserved.0 9
The regulation of human encroachment on and destruction of wildlife,
however, is different. The Endangered Species Act of 1973210 regulates
neither channels of commerce, since plants and animals are not comparable
to lakes, streams, or air; nor instrumentalities, since wildlife is not akin to
trucks, boats, or airplanes. As such, the Endangered Species Act must have
a substantial effect on interstate commerce, per the limited Economic
Activity interpretation proposed here, in order to be constitutional under the
Commerce Clause. Since regulating the protection of animals is not the
direct regulation of valuable transactions, the Act must have the purpose of
effecting valuable transactions. But the Act employs no jurisdictional
element. Further, the Act's purpose is to preserve ecosystems inhabited by
endangered species and to provide programs for the conservation of
endangered and threatened species.2 1' The Act preserves the "esthetic,
ecological, educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value" of
wildlife for the nation's benefit 2  And unlike the FACE Act, the
Endangered Species Act does not have an unstated purpose of directly
affecting a valuable transaction. As such, the Act does not have the purpose
of regulating a valuable transaction and is accordingly unconstitutional
under the limited Economic Activity interpretation. This shows the
unfortunate side-effect of curbing the once-plenary power Congress
wielded; some popular, socially beneficial laws are simply unconstitutional
when the Commerce Clause is not interpreted to make Congress
omnipotent. Bounds must be drawn on Congressional Commerce Clause
power in order for federalism to survive, and the Endangered Species Act is
beyond the bound drawn by the limited Economic Activity interpretation.
209 See United States v. Coombs, 37 U.S. 72 (1838); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1834).
2 10 Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
211 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b).
212 16 U.S.C. § 1531(a)(3).
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Environmentalists, however, should neither concede the fight for
wildlife nor turn their ire toward the limited Economic Activity
interpretation. Instead, focus should turn to the Constitution's amendment
process.213 Regulation of the environment, as Professor Donald Regan
notes, cannot be successfully implemented by the competing states.214
Furthermore, the environment is a public good that cannot go unregulated,
due to Tragedy of the Commons problems.2" In other words, regulation of
endangered species, and more generally, regulation of the environment as a
whole, belongs with the federal government. Since under the limited
Economic Activity interpretation, the Constitution currently does not
provide Congress with certain environmental regulatory powers, such as
those needed for the Endangered Species Act to be constitutional, a
Constitutional amendment is the appropriate resolution.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the circuit courts currently refuse to strictly abide by
Morrison due to confusion, ideological disagreement, or belief that Lopez
and Morrison do not amount to new Commerce Clause restrictions, the
refusal has led to a variety of inconsistencies in Commerce Clause
constitutionality attacks. Unfortunately, this is an area in which uniformity
is most desired, particularly because Congress will not abide by the
Supreme Court's Commerce Clause limitations when making federal
criminal law knowing that the laws will not be found unconstitutional in the
lower courts. The constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B), the child
pornography possession statute; the FACE Act; and 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), the
machinegun possession statute, all are ripe for further adjudication.
Although review of any one of these by the Supreme Court will offer the
opportunity for further refinement of the Morrison Economic Activity Test,
uniformity and consistency may also be achieved if lower courts adhere to
the guiding principles relied upon in this paper.
This paper has shown that a workable, clear standard exists for
deciding whether a regulated activity is "economic." The paper has also
shown that a clear standard does not need to conflict with a desired "case-
by-case inquiry." With further review, the once-plenary "Hey, you-can-do-
whatever-you-feel-like Clause 2 16 will again have the form of an
211 U.S. CONST. art. V.
214 See Regan, supra note 20, at 609.
215 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Sci., Vol. 162, No. 3859, Dec. 13,
1968, at 1243.
216 See Kozinski, supra note 43, at 5.
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enumerated power, thereby reserving a wide range of legislative authority,
including the vast criminal law domain, to the States.
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